Why is the Chinese aid model increasingly popular in Africa?
The world today is very different from what it looked like only a few weeks ago. Indeed, the results of the US Presidential elections on 10 November has been a major blow to the advocates of globalization, many of whom have also been champions of increased foreign aid to, and trade with, developing countries with the aim of reducing poverty and promoting economic growth and development.
The Malawi University of Science and Technology (MUST) in Thyolo, southern Malawi, built with a concessional loan from China
Photo: Dan Banik
The past decade has witnessed increased activity of so-called emerging economies in trying to influence social and economic policies around the world. In particular China, but also India, Brazil, and many other emerging countries, are interacting in numerous ways with poorer countries, including so-called South–South dialogues. Such dialogues give access to natural resources and new and growing markets, and also reduce the dependence of low-income countries on traditional forms of aid from the Global North. These emerging countries and their policies therefore have represented a counterweight to the policies and development aid models that have for long been promoted directly or indirectly (e.g. through multilateral institutions) in poor countries by the Global North.
China has been one of the most dominant actors in relation to providing aid and undertaking investments in Africa. However, China is not a new actor in Africa, having been active on the continent for several decades. Nonetheless, its activities – and the volume of aid and related activity – have dramatically increased, and China is now Africa’s largest trading partner with a substantial aid and investment portfolio in virtually every country on the continent. China’s development aid and investment activity has, over the years, been the subject of much scholarly attention. Much of the scholarly work of China in Africa has been focused on the controversies around the blurred boundaries between aid and investments, the lack of transparency on aid practices, and the lack of focus on democracy, human rights and gender equality. In response, the Chinese government has insisted that the assistance it provides to African countries is not based on charity, but rather on the principles of ‘win–win’, ‘non-interference’, ‘mutual respect’ and ‘friendship’, underscored by China fulfilling its obligations of international solidarity with developing countries.
Malawi provides an illustrative example of how China is re-shaping the architecture of development aid. Malawi’s economy is heavily dependent on western foreign aid, which funds almost 40 per cent of the national budget. In recent years, China has emerged as a major donor in the country and has been supporting a wide range of projects -- from infrastructure and health to education and agricultural technology. China’s development assistance strategy in Malawi is based on very different practices and procedures from that provided for in the Paris Declaration. Indeed, unlike most western donors, China does not abide by the principles of harmonization, alignment and managing results. The Chinese aid and investment strategies primarily function in isolation to the strategies of other activities in the field (i.e. are not harmonized) and China does not participate in providing basket funds. Similarly, China avoids involving the Malawian administrative service in the implementation of its projects, preferring to continue with a strategy of involving Chinese contractors, some of whom go on to make substantial investments of their own in the country upon completion of their contracts.
Despite the rhetoric often found in western media outlets, I do not find substantial evidence to indicate that western donors and the Chinese are competing in Africa. Rather, the picture that emerges from my studies is that western donors accept that they and China are involved in very different sectors and very different types of activities. Although China also provides aid directed at the agricultural and medical sectors, in addition to stipends and grants for travel to China, Chinese activities are mainly related to infrastructural projects implemented in Malawi. The Chinese neither support the Malawian government through budget support nor explicitly promote democratic consolidation or gender equality. Therefore, western donors often believe that their activities usefully complement those of China in Malawi. Nonetheless, the Chinese believe their aid practices are much more in tune with what Malawi requires, rather than western donors who wish to impose conditionalities on the aid recipient country.
Many Malawians believe that Chinese aid usefully complements western aid. Indeed, the findings from recent Afrobarometer surveys in 36 African countries suggest that large sections of the African public believe that "China either matches or surpasses the United States in popularity as a development model". This does not mean that the focus by the West on gender equality, human rights and good governance, health, education and climate smart technologies is misplaced. Rather, the situation on the ground, at least for now, appears to be one of peaceful co-existence between Western donors and China.
The Chinese aid and investment model is also rapidly changing and the Chinese government is trying adapt to newer circumstances and more complex demands for more long-term oriented assistance from African leaders. A major challenge for the Chinese is the absence of a development agency and civil society organizations that can coordinate aid, provide expert advice and monitor the implementation of projects. In recent years, China has increasingly relied on Chinese companies operating in Africa to offer knowledge and expertise within specific fields such as infrastructure, agriculture, education, tourism and trade. It is unclear, however, how sustainable this new form of public-private partnership will be in the long run as the modalities of Chinese aid and investments become more complex.
